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„Vive la diférence" (Ostendorf) 
Critical fashions come and go, what stays is the need for critical discern-
ment. 
“Difference is the dimension in which we dwell” (Heidegger) 
Originally developed by theorists such as Edward Kamau 
Brathwaite and Edouard Glissant to describe the creolized 
identity of post-slavery Caribbean populations, the idea of 
cultural hybridity was introduced into the literary universe 
(under the term „mongrelization” ) by Salman Rushdie. Yet it 
was not until Homi K. Bhabha's theoretical development of 
the metaphoric notion of hybridity that the concept finally 
became indispensable to academic critical discourse. 
Although viewed by many scholars with skepticism, nobody 
so far has managed to offer an alternative of comparable 
power. Two aspects in particular have contributed to the 
concept's enduring attraction: its polemical edge and its    
optimistic promise.  
From the start, 'mongrelization'/'hybridity' was directed by 
Rushdie/Bhabha against the racial purity and alleged superi-
ority of white Western culture and its voracious appetite for 
global domination. Other civilizations have made similar    
attempts at hegemony but none has proved equally success-
ful in the long run. Max Weber was the first to inquire into 
the specific reasons for this amazing phenomenon for which 
causal explanations alone seem to be insufficient. Buttressed 
by superior technology, it was above all the scientific, phi-
losophical, and theological world picture which gave Europe-
ans a rational and comprehensive conception of the world 
and a unified image of man – and hence the impression that 
their civilization was destined "to inherit the earth". Edward 
Said took up the gauntlet and used a postcolonial agenda to 
undermine Western hegemonic discourse and its colonial 
power basis. In the struggle for self-determination, the con-
cept of hybridity could be used as an effective political wea-
pon not only against racial discrimination, but also against 
discriminatory practices on the levels of gender, religion, and 
of ethnic bias frequently linked to national ambitions. In his 
enormously influential book The Location of Culture Bhabha 
tellingly named one of the chapters "DissemiNation". 
In brief, 'hybridity' could be employed both as a pharmakon 
to heal unjust but ingrained sociocultural divisions and as a 
battle cry to fight discrimination in all spheres of life. This was 
quite in keeping with the postmodern effort to unmask the 
disastrous sociopolitical effects of absolutist binary thinking 
and of hidden power structures in general. Like Rushdie, 
Bhabha sought to overcome the self-erected borders of hu-
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man societies and their nefarious desire for social, religious, 
ethnic, and political categorization. No wonder, 'hybridity' 
conveyed a tremendously optimistic message. It seemed to 
offer a Camino Real, a royal way, toward transcending those 
borders that have played havoc with us in history. Besides, 
the concept was sufficiently vague to accommodate different 
versions of 'hybridity', ranging from eclectic forms of syn-
cretism to selective adaptations of everyday social practices. 
Not infrequently, 'hybridity' has assumed the function of a 
traveler's survival kit in crossing national, ethnic and religious 
frontiers. On closer examination, however, we find that 
'hybridity' can be as much of a burden as a help. For those on 
the lower social level it may lead to tremendous difficulties 
and profound cultural confusion, for the better-off and the 
socioculturally secure it may prove a richly broadening ex-
perience. From this perspective, Clifford's "delight in cultural 
impurity and disturbing syncretism" remains dubious in view 
of  underdeveloped and weak third-world cultures. 
As a theoretical tool, 'hybridity' has unquestionably raised 
academic critical discourse onto a higher and more nuanced 
level of self-reflection. Not only in academia, in other cultural 
spheres as well, the concept appears to apply with consider-
able success. In art, for instance, 'hybridity' has practically be-
come the norm. Hybrid and heterolingual texts and songs 
begin to abound. A Chinese musician recently composed a 
"Matthäus-Passion" (called "Water Passion" in honor of 
Bach, i.e. brook) that synthesizes Chinese musical structures 
with Western themes into amazingly novel forms. The com-
position is unusually enjoyable and strangely attractive to 
both Chinese and Western audiences. 
The concept of hybridity appears to serve equally well in   
everyday life. It works for both individual persons (especially 
artists and academics) and collectively for cultures which have 
managed to transform destructive historical, political and so-
ciocultural conflicts into dynamic and creative exchanges. 
Demonstrably, Chicano/a culture is a case in point. No won-
der, Donna Haraway in her „Manifesto” sees Chicanas as ex-
emplary cyborgs and ideal postmodernist subjects. The ques-
tion may nonetheless be raised whether the cultural   success 
story of the Chicano/a community must be viewed as an iso-
lated phenomenon within the larger context of the Americas 
and as a product of exceptionally favorable geographic, cli-
matic and sociocultural factors. Relatively little comparative 
research has so far been done on the collision of various o-
ther Latino cultures with the dominant US-mainstream cul-
ture, nor do we have sufficient scholarship on inter-Latino 
relations and on variants of responses to the pressures of 
globalization. It would be immensely interesting to learn what 
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forms of hybridity (or modes of self-assertion) such encoun-
ters provoke in Latin America and the United States, both in-
terculturally and intraculturally.  
Similar questions might be raised for US-culture where analy-
ses of inter-minority sociocultural exchanges are still some-
what rare. What remains largely unanalyzed (to select a ran-
dom example) is the encounter between different religions in 
the Americas (e.g. magic-colored catholicism and evangelical-
ism with its penchant for scriptural fundamentalism). In how 
far the concept of hybridity is also of use on the level of    
everyday family life and its practices remains uncertain in view 
of the differing familial structures and the unequal status of 
woman in the US and its southern neighbors. Despite enor-
mous cultural differences within the region, Latin America still 
presents a remarkably solid patriarchal system.  
Only a hemispheric approach supported by detailed analyses 
of intergroup and interminority relations will enable us to an-
swer such questions. What is disregarded in most current 
studies is the temporal development of Latin American cultu-
res and their internal modifications which often display 
distinct phases of structural change. Cultures, after all, take 
shape in time and they undergo constant transformations – 
at least "hot cultures" do. Nor should intracultural differen-
ces be lost sight of. High culture (including avant-garde art) 
may well be contested and criticized by "lower" cultural art 
forms, in the field of music, song, and the performing arts no 
less than in the visual arts or in cyberpunk and other pop   
elements – with film and TV taking on the role of cultural 
leaders. The varying responses of these different strata of cul-
ture to high culture, to hegemonic influences from outside, 
and to the impact of a globalized culture in general may turn 
out to be rather diverse in different ethnopolitical areas. Here 
as elsewhere, the notion of hybridity can still be of use, but 
its analytical range and explanatory force for future research 
appears limited. These limitations become increasingly visible 
both in academic research, in praxis-oriented field analysis, 
and in social life at large. Let us briefly examine some of the 
reasons. 
The crucial drawback of the concept of hybridity appears to 
be a lack of critical perspective. In consequence of its anti-
discriminatory thrust, flattening out all racial, religious, ethnic 
and other sociocultural differences, 'hybridity' is practically 
devoid of all critical and evaluatory power. Its original 
strength thus turns out to be its central weakness. What is 
missing is an ethical horizon. It is by no means accidental that 
Rushdie's novel Satanic Verses is limited in its ethical concerns 
to sheer sarcasm, a form of disrespect toward Muslim culture 
which created a Pandemonium of hateful voices and an 
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unprecedented outburst of murderous hostility. His later 
novel The Moor's Last Sigh merely confirms the author's disil-
lusionment about the possibilities of individual and collective 
cultural 'hybridity'. 
Multiculturalism, envisaged as a postmodern way of peace-
fully living together in a metonymic side-by-side, and 'hybri-
dity' as an attempt to overcome the pluralist discourse of 
"separate but equal" in terms of 'contamination' – or, at 
best, of a partial exchange of cultural elements mutually    
appreciated as valid alternatives to one's own cultural make-
up – both present ways of existence that seem to rely on a 
specific vision of society. It is, by and large, a harmonious vi-
sion of "live and let live", reminiscent of Ivan Illych's ideal of 
"conviviality". As Rushdie's own biography shows, however, 
this vision does not appear to be true to present-day reality; 
Brecht’s dictum comes to mind: „Doch die Verhältnisse, sie 
sind nicht so.” Ours is a conflict-laden world, not exactly Lyo-
tard's "general agonistic" perhaps, but we definitely have to 
face the fact that cultures differ in fundamental ways, and 
that we cannot avoid making critical decisions. 
The concept of hybridity, by contrast, far from taking socio-
cultural distinctions seriously, strives to disregard – and even 
dissolve – differences, thus making ethical choices largely ir-
relevant. It should be noted, however, that Bhabha has re-
cently made his own ethical turn, albeit in a characteristically 
ironic mode. In two splendid (partly overlapping) essays he 
has raised the issue of “cultural choice” and of “cultural re-
spect”. In the latter, Bhabha focuses on “the neighbor in the 
moral sense of the term”. Recalling Joseph Conrad’s Lord 
Jim, he notes the author’s insistence on the impossibility to 
distinguish in Jim’s choice between right and wrong, be-
tween truth and lie. All in all, Bhabha remains faithful to his 
tactics of ambivalence and ambiguity. The new element in 
both essays is the Freudian concept of the joke.  
In a brilliant maneuvre Bhabha exploits Freud’s notion of 
joke-work, thus providing “a way for minority communities 
to confront and regulate the abuse that comes from ‘outside’ 
and the criticisms that emerge from within the community 
itself.” It is a strategy of communal self-identification that 
evades the trap of erecting fixed ethnic defenses since the 
joker identifies with his own community while at the same 
time being able to appreciate the jokes directed against him 
by outsiders. The self-critical stance is meant to keep „a pas-
sageway open for a range of border-crossings and cross-
border identifications.” Finally, such joke-work raises the   
issue of truth “as an ethical and social practice.” What the 
jokes attack, according to Freud, is not a person “but the cer-
tainty of truth itself.” Taking the “third person”, the witness 
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and his reaction into account, Freud highlights the insecure 
basis of all knowledge production. Such recognition, to 
Bhabha, „becomes an act of cultural survival and historical 
renewal” not least because it defuses the ever-present     
danger of ideologial collision. It is in the ironic wisdom of the 
joke that Bhabha grounds his hope for cultural continuity and 
solidarity, a slender hope no doubt, but a hope nonetheless.  
Master of ambivalence and ambiguity, Bhabha tries to get 
around the crucial moment of decision by means of an “itera-
tive practice of the self-critical joke-work”, basing his plea to 
leave alterity “neither disavowed nor suppressed but worked-
around” on the expectation that such work “will be carried 
out somewhere between tears and laughter”. Bhabha’s use 
of the Freudian concept is highly sophisticated but its self-
ironic performance has a double-edged quality, pushing both 
the jesting subject and the subject of the joke toward the 
parodic. Self-irony as an ethical stance may indeed be the 
peak of human wisdom (in a Nietzschean rather than a So-
cratic sense), but who can attain to such wisdom? As a 
shrewd intellectual gesture it is but of doubtful social relevan-
ce. Besides, Bhabha’s concern with valueloaded terms like 
choice and responsibility rests ultimately with Derrida’s notion 
of “accountability”, itself caught in the mesh of multiple, 
heterogeneous, and contradictory injunctions, a posture 
which is in stark contrast to Lévinas’ radical ethics of uncondi-
tional responsibility. These reservations aside, it is to be 
hoped that Bhabha’s deep meditations on moral choice will 
enrich the concept of hybridity (and related concepts) with an 
enduring ethical quality, thus remedying a long-felt lack. 
Indeed, what most strikes us in the academic usage of the 
concept of hybridity is its utopian core, more exactly the ex-
pectation that hybrid sociocultural processes might eventually 
help to erase all socially constructed differences, in particular 
troublesome value differences. The desired goal may be no-
ble: interpersonal and intercultural concord based on a purely 
utilitarian view of society. One need not have read Max We-
ber or Simmel to recognize that this is not the way societies 
usually function. Brecht’s dictum comes to mind: “Aber die 
Verhältnisse sie sind nicht so.” If Dahrendorf is right, societies 
(especially "open societies") are best described by means of a 
"conflict model", a model early on adopted by the British 
Cultural-Studies movement (although the idea of class con-
flict no longer forms the model's center). Fanon’s advocacy of 
revolutionary violence – his ethical impulse notwithstanding – 
should alert us to the profound antagonisms that endanger 
the liberal narrative of pluralistic difference. More recently, 
Bhabha himself has pondered this problem in his thoughtful 
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contribution “On the Irremovable Strangeness of Being Dif-
ferent”. 
Whatever social model we happen to embrace, however, in 
our present world we simply cannot afford to give up the no-
tion of choice and, along with it, the critical concept of dif-
ference. Interestingly enough, these concepts are now in-
creasingly being debated in scholarly discussions revolving 
around the subject or self which seemed to have become su-
perfluous after the postmodernist assault on ‚identity’. It was 
feminists like Butler and postmarxist critics like Jameson who 
tried to retrieve the subject as responsible agent in political 
affairs (especially in gender politics). In The Psychic Life Butler 
recognizes identity as an unavoidable if dangerous fact of 
social existence. After Seyla Benhabib's well-known and 
rightly celebrated work, two novel studies, in particular, offer 
an up-to-date analysis of the subject as agent: Calvin O. 
Schrag's The Self after Postmodernity (Yale UP 1999) and 
Meir Dan-Cohen's collection Harmful Thoughts. Essays on 
Law, Self, and Morality (Princeton UP 2002). Both books re-
flect on personal identity, moral dignity and autonomy, on 
freedom of choice, on responsibility and commitment. 
Drawing on Dan-Cohen's insights, we may note that 'hybrid-
ity' is, by and large, concerned with value-neutral selections 
or preferences. It is not until we employ a differential per-
spective on culture that selective preferences become "elec-
tive", i.e. value-oriented choices. This is especially true for 
"differences that make a difference" as Gregory Bateson fa-
mously put it. And it is only in such cases that ethical com-
mitments (over time) are being made, otherwise "invest-
ments" in preferential choices remain tentative (in a post-
modernist sense). The suspicion may not be unfounded that, 
in addition to the postmodern bias toward relativism, the 
almost frantic shying away from the concepts of identity and 
moral choice was underpropped by the irrational fear of ap-
pearing politically incorrect. 
Although the concept of difference (based on Saussure's 
work) was fundamental to the methods used by structuralists, 
we shall have to make a deliberate effort to recover 'differ-
ence' as a critical tool, since it was distrusted by many post-
modernists anxious to prevent the return of identity philoso-
phy and of binary thinking. It was especially Lyotard who – in 
choosing le différent as the key term and center of his world-
view – totalized 'difference' to 'heterogeneity' and practically 
destroyed the concept's usefulness (as Habermas, Rorty and 
others were quick to point out). Nor was Derrida's intrigu-
ingly fluid and subtly temporalized différance – its phenome-
nal influence notwithstanding – helpful in advancing a theory 
of differential analysis, let alone a theory of moral choice. It 
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comes as little surprise that Derrida, late in life, had to turn to 
Lévinas in his "ethical turn" so as to offset the semantically 
and normatively precarious status of an endlessly free-floating 
signifier derived from an equally endless series of concate-
nated differences. In a recent – and somewhat self-defensive 
– move, he now lays claim to deconstruction as the most ad-
vanced method of (adademic) criticism. Foucault's Nietzsche-
inspired aesthetico-ethical turn, shortly before his death, is an 
instance too familiar to need detailed mention here. 
Why, we may ask, is 'difference' indispensable as a concep-
tual tool to both theoretical reflection and social praxis? The 
answer is straightforward: it is our only way out of the quan-
dary of relativism and pluralism postmodernity has left us in. 
For a long time it seemed to be an axiom in Western culture 
that there were overarching standards according to which we 
might judge and act. This hope for (and belief in) absolute 
guiding norms was wiped out by postmodernism, Derrida's 
"Mythologie blanche" (in Margins of Philosophy) being the 
deadly stroke that demolished the Platonic universe along 
with the Kantian system of transcendental thought and its 
critical rebuttal: Hegelian dialectics – or so it seemed. 
Having lost an authoritative principle to judge by, we have to 
look for a different approach – and a different mode of rea-
soning – which might help us to reach fitting critical res-
ponses. These critical judgments – that is the crucial point – 
should be self-authenticating and independent of outer crite-
ria fixed in advance. Calvin O. Schrag puts us on track: The 
criterion can be nothing else but the act of judging itself: 
"discernment". As David James Miller reminds us: to know is 
to distinguish, an insight graphically expressed by the Greek 
verb "krino" which includes the interrelated senses of "dis-
cerning, distinguishing, selecting, judging and assessing". The 
Greek verb is almost perfectly mirrored by the German verb 
"urteilen" which means both to distinguish and to judge or 
more exactly: to judge on the basis of distinctions.  
What then are we as critics doing when we try to critically 
evaluate cultural phenomena, in particular features of widely 
differing cultures? In comparing cultural elements or sets of 
elements, we bring these features (which in reality form part 
of different life-worlds) into a unified mental configuration, 
thus playing them off against each other, not in a strictly dia-
lectical fashion but in a relationship of challenge and compe-
titive rivalry, tempered by mutual respect. Marking out dif-
ferences intensifies our awareness of the cultural elements in 
question, creates a new horizon of understanding and ele-
vates our reasoning onto a higher level of reflexion, at the 
same time inviting (if not compelling) us to make judgmental 
choices. "This construal of discernment" – Schrag insists – 
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“supplies its own criterion and sanction for judgment". 
Schrag has recourse to Wittgenstein's theory of language 
games and, ultimately, to Aristotle's phronesis, a form of 
"praxial critique" or practical wisdom, "infusing responsivity 
with responsibility", prompting ethically determined respon-
ses.  
At this point we seem to come up against a wall. If our criti-
cal endeavors are supposed to generate considered judg-
ments without the authority of ulterior norms, it is finally the 
act of comparing as such that is supposed to set our stan-
dards. Whatever degree of precision we may achieve, how-
ever, acts of discernment are still situated in our own time 
and milieu. It is only by interpreting our critical endeavors as 
"interventions" (Schrag) into cultural processes that we are 
capable of distancing ourselves from our respective traditions, 
thus transcending our ordinary positional limitations. It re-
mains doubtful, however, whether cultural criticism can be 
effective without at least some vision of what the good life 
should be, which in turn, can hardly be conceived without 
help from the critic's own cultural heritage. On the other 
hand, the encounter with the Other is apt to create a new 
and expanded context which modifies and broadens our   
emotional and cognitive horizon (and along with it our   
sphere of liberty), enriches our relations, enlarges our critical 
resources and at the same time problematizes our cultural 
perspective.  
In conclusion: the search for critical standards is by no means 
a hopeless project even though we have to do without the 
assistance of anterior and exterior norms, be they of a    
Kantian, Hegelian or whatever other provenance. Nonethe-
less, critical discernment involving differentiation and evalua-
tion is never an easy task, the more so as such discernments 
are per se revisionary acts requiring ethical choices that – de-
pending on one's respective cultural circumstances – all too 
often involve the risk of sailing into the wind. 
The notion of difference as a critical concept (along with sub-
ject and choice) was never entirely abandoned, of course, 
though it may have lost its cutting edge for a while as dem-
onstrated by the rise of neopositivism and the advance of sys-
tems theory in science and the humanities. It soon returned 
with a vengeance in the method of deconstruction which – 
based on differential readings – set out to exploit the internal 
conflicts between different layers of language. Though de-
nounced by traditionalists as destructive and even nihilistic, 
the method has displayed a considerable potential for un-
masking surface arguments used to disguise hidden aporias. 
From this angle, deconstruction is by no means unqualified to 
make critical value judgments as James Hillis Miller has com-
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pellingly argued in several studies that both continue and sig-
nificantly transform Derrida’s critical mode. Rudolph Binion's 
fascinating study Sounding the Classics (Praeger Publishers 
1997) is a fine example demonstrating the ethical dimension 
of deconstruction. Interpreting eminent works of world litera-
ture, Binion reveals the dialectical tension of text and subtext, 
which he understands as conflictual processes interior to the 
theme of a given work of art. 
A comparable mode of analysis in the field of political studies 
may be found in the indispensable collection Alternative Con-
ceptions of Civil Society (Princeton UP 2002), a volume whose 
essays present in-depth studies of various versions of civil so-
ciety (Jewish, Islamic, Christian, Confucian, communitarian, 
classical liberalism). It is in the concluding essay by Michael A. 
Mosher that we discover an interesting example of differen-
tial analysis. Mosher critically surveys the several alternatives 
from a comparatist point of view, highlighting their respective 
differences vis-a-vis each other. The result is a reasoned value 
judgment, approaching what Rawls has called "a reflective 
equilibrium". 
Pursuing this line of critical thought, we should be careful to 
keep in mind the dialectical aim of difference, namely synthe-
sis, although no longer understood in a strictly Hegelian sense 
but rather as a regulative idea of creating a society grounded 
in peaceful togetherness. Now that all "great narratives" are 
abandoned and all the grand utopias turned sour, we have 
become modest in our expectations. Not coincidence but 
convergence should henceforth be our goal (Schrag). The re-
cognition of differences is a necessary precondition but not 
an end in itself. Although we have to make an effort to ex-
pand our knowledge of sociocultural differences so as to bet-
ter appreciate and respect each other (not only as we are but 
also how we have come to be who we are, how we appear 
to others and how others judge us), we must not stop there. 
A further step is required: opening up a dialogue, not by a-
dopting Apel's or Habermas' project of a consensus-oriented 
conversation but (to use Schrag’s term) aiming at a form of 
"transversal communication" (a concept reminiscent of 
Wolfgang Welsch’s  “Transversalität” and “transversale Ver-
nunft”) which, more than any “reasonable Middle Way" 
strategy, enriches our knowledge of each other and, most 
importantly, of the differences that separate us from one an-
other – differences which, strange to add, make our cultural 
lives interesting and meaningful.   
As we may learn from Kant, Arendt and Kohlberg, the pre-
condition of all dialogic exchange is the readiness to listen, 
more precisely: the willingness to assume (in Stuart Hall's 
terminology) a "bifocal view" or "double perspective" 
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(Hagenbuechle) which is at bottom no other than a differen-
tial view signaling distinctions rather than likenesses (which 
would need no further effort). In this context, Kant speaks of 
an "enlarged mentality" and an enlarged self, Arendt (echo-
ing Cicero) of "representative thinking, to think from the 
point of view of others", Seyla Benhabib of a context-
sensitive „reversing of perspectives”, and Kohlberg calls it 
tout court "the moral point of view". Whatever term we use, 
we are called upon to make an effort in order to achieve a 
self-transcendent view which allows us – based on the con-
cept of cultural differentiation – not only to evaluate the O-
ther qua Other but also to criticize ourselves in relation to and 
in rivalry with the Other. Such enactment of differences 
transcends the postmodernist ideal of oscillation, of yo-yoing 
(Pynchon) between different cultural stances, a tactics that 
successfully avoids the particularism of identity politics but 
has its price in that it lacks an ethical horizon and a vision of 
the good life thereby neglecting the emancipatory goal which 
alone can orient a society towards a better future.  
Helmbrecht Breinig offers an excitingly new concept called 
“transdifference” and which – unlike hybridity – emphatically 
insists on difference while aiming for a transformed state of 
cultural identity (not to be conflated with the notion of 
"transculturation"). As a critical term it is undeniably superior 
to most rivals in the field, and its potentiality for generaliza-
tion – if not universalization – is impressive. “Transdifference” 
as a carefully defined notion should encourage us to rethink 
the question of how to deal with difference both on an indi-
vidual and a collective level. The prefix “trans”, in developing 
Bhabha’s notions of “transformation” and, more pointedly, 
“transvaluation” carries an ethical quality that has been 
wanting so far in the concept of hybridity. Still, like other ap-
proaches “Transdifference” has to meet the challenge of 
how to put theoretical reflexions into praxis and to apply 
them to everyday life. This is the more difficult as it is a trans-
formative process which is, as Herrnstein-Smith reminds us, 
inevitably value-loaded and positioned.  
There is no universal solvent to this vexing problem. Wittgen-
stein (as Stephen Toulmin recalls) was convinced that any 
agreement we might reach would not be a matter of intellec-
tual consensus, it would be a convergence of humane atti-
tudes. To teach ourselves and our children better ways of 
respecting sociocultural differences is far from easy, but it is 
our only chance. We have to “proceed with caution” and 
with respectful distance as Doris Sommers advises us. To risk 
going an uncertain way toward the other while keeping our 
integrity is an unavoidable task in an increasingly globalized 
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world; what is more, it is a historical summons if only we take 
our cultural roots seriously.  
Paul Geyer has recently proposed a critical theory of culture 
(“Eine kritische Theorie der Kultur”) based on a refreshingly 
innovative model of differential analysis as part of an ongoing 
research project at Bonn University. In his remarkable study 
Beyond Solidarity. Pragmatism and Difference in a Globalized 
World Giles Gunn has explored in depth a comparable line of 
inquiry from a universalized pragmatist perspective in order to 
come to grips with cultural differences. Remembering prag-
matism's notorious illusions concerning human evil, some 
might hesitate to accept Gunn’s optimistic conclusion, but his 
all too brief reference at the end to aesthetics as a promising 
field in our search for “a sharable human world” deserves 
attention. Clearly, aesthetics has once more become an issue 
in contemporary scholarship but a fully developed theory of 
aesthetics as a formative principle of cultural production is 
still lacking. Such a theory might radically redirect research in 
this area. Whatever the chosen angle of inquiry, it should find 
a rich and provocative source in Friedrich Schiller’s magisterial 
Letters on Aesthetic Education (Ueber die ästhetische Erzie-
hung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen).  
In view of the above reflections, the concept of border takes 
on a radically different significance from its conventional 
meaning as a stable and divisive frontier. José David Saldívar's 
shrewdly ambivalent title sets the agenda: Border Matters. 
Indeed, borders matter supremely. On the level of praxis, 
borders highlight sociocultural differences functioning as po-
tential catalysts for intersubjective processes of negotiation 
and exchange; on the theoretical level, borders are signifiers 
of the first magnitude. The problem is that they can be mis-
leading signifiers, depending on one's point of view. Bhabha 
himself – relying on his notion of "cultural difference" (as 
against "cultural diversity") – has repeatedly reflected on the 
problematic and ambivalent aspect of borders. He speaks of 
"border line engagements", and of "interstices" across 
which culture-specific views and social practices can be nego-
tiated. Unfortunately, Bhabha has omitted to supplement his 
abstract theorizing with concrete examples. The idea of an 
open, if ambivalent, "Third Space" (including Bhabha's     
notion of a "nonsovereign" subject) is attractive but vague 
and offers little theoretical and practical help. After Hegel 
and, more recently, Jaspers it was probably Plessner who    
made the most constructive contribution to the concept of 
border, throwing into relief its double quality of closing off 
and opening up – viewing borders and frontiers as starting 
lines for bridge-building as Bassam Tibi has reconceived the 
concept. 
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In assuming a differential double perspective (call it an “ethics 
of imagination”) we are enabled to create a self-transcendent 
value horizon, certainly not in Gadamer's sense of a "fusion 
of horizons", but in terms of a heightened awareness of the 
differences that separate us from others yet (as we ought to 
remember) also link us to others through what often are in-
visible ties of connection which tend to form "contrapuntal 
ensembles" (Said), inviting us to interact, contest, and nego-
tiate. In this way, we not only come to gain a perspectival 
basis for criticizing other cultures, we also lay ourselves open 
to the Other's critical gaze. Most importantly, we must sum-
mon the courage to turn our eyes critically on ourselves and 
our own cultural tradition. This is, in the final analysis, the 
true challenge given by the bifocal view or double perspec-
tive.  
Lastly, we should not ignore the many pitfalls that put our 
project at risk: the ceaseless struggle for power, the dangers 
of ideology, instrumentalization and indoctrination, false 
consciousness, ‘bad faith’ and, most of all, the profound am-
bivalence pervading human nature whose creative center, as 
Freud has taught us, remains the source of the best as well as 
the worst that humans are capable of. Uncomfortable as such 
insights may be, they should induce us to foster a sense of 
humility or, at least, of reserve and "interpretive charity" 
(Davidson) – lacking which no genuinely critical discernment, 
no ethical choice, no open dialogue, and no livable commu-
nity seem possible in our strife-torn world. 
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